If a protocol expects to compare two strings and is prepared only for those strings to be ASCII, then using Unicode code points in those strings requires they be prepared somehow. Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications
However, a review (see [78PRECIS] ) of these protocol specifications found that they are very similar and can be grouped into a short number of classes. Moreover, many reuse the same Stringprep profile, such as the SASL one.
IDNA2003 was replaced because of some limitations described in [RFC4690] . The new IDN specification, called IDNA2008 [RFC5890] , [RFC5891] , [RFC5892] , [RFC5893] was designed based on the considerations found in [RFC5894] . One of the effects of IDNA2008 is that Nameprep and Stringprep are not used at all. Instead, an algorithm based on Unicode properties of code points is defined. That algorithm generates a stable and complete table of the supported Unicode code points for each Unicode version. This algorithm uses an inclusion-based approach, instead of the exclusion-based approach of Stringprep/Nameprep. That is, IDNA2003 created an explicit list of excluded or mapped-away characters; anything in Unicode 3.2 that was not so listed could be assumed to be allowed under the protocol. IDNA2008 begins instead from the assumption that code points are disallowed and then relies on Unicode properties to derive whether a given code point actually is allowed in the protocol.
This document lists the shortcomings and issues found by protocols listed above that defined Stringprep profiles. It also lists the requirements for any potential replacement of Stringprep.
Keywords
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
This document uses various internationalization terms, which are defined and discussed in [RFC6365] . The section on treating the existing known cases, Appendix A, uses the categories above.
Effect of Comparison
The three classes of comparison style outlined in Section 5.1.1 may have different effects when applied. It is necessary to evaluate the effects if a comparison results in a false positive or a false negative, especially in terms of the consequences to security and usability.
Dealing with Characters
This section outlines a range of issues having to do with characters in the target protocols, the ways in which IDNA2008 might be a good analogy to other protocols, and ways in which it might be a poor one. [RFC3454], Section 3, outlines a number of characters that are mapped to nothing, and also permits Stringprep profiles to define their own mappings.
Prohibited Characters
Along with case folding and other character mappings, many protocols have characters that are simply disallowed. For example, control characters and special characters such as "@" or "/" may be prohibited in a protocol.
One of the primary changes of IDNA2008 is in the way it approaches Unicode code points, using the new inclusion-based approach (see Section 1).
Because of the default assumption in IDNA2008 that a code point is not allowed by the protocol, it has more than one class of "allowed by the protocol"; this is unlike IDNA2003. While some code points are disallowed outright, some are allowed only in certain contexts.
The reasons for the context-dependent rules have to do with the way some characters are used. For instance, the ZERO WIDTH JOINER and ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER (ZWJ, U+200D and ZWNJ, U+200C) are allowed with contextual rules because they are required in some circumstances, yet are considered punctuation by Unicode and would therefore be DISALLOWED under the usual IDNA2008 derivation rules. The goal of IDNA2008 is to provide the widest repertoire of code points possible and consistent with the traditional DNS "LDH" (letters, digits, hyphen) rule (see [RFC0952] ), trusting to the operators of individual zones to make sensible (and usually more restrictive) policies for their zones.
5.2.5. Internal Structure, Delimiters, and Special Characters IDNA2008 has a special problem with delimiters, because the delimiter "character" in the DNS wire format is not really part of the data. In DNS, labels are not separated exactly; instead, a label carries with it an indicator that says how long the label is. When the label is displayed in presentation format as part of a fully qualified domain name, the label separator FULL STOP, U+002E (.) is used to break up the labels. But because that label separator does not travel with the wire format of the domain name, there is no way to encode a different, "internationalized" separator in IDNA2008.
Other protocols may include characters with similar special meaning within the protocol. Common characters for these purposes include FULL STOP, U+002E (.); COMMERCIAL AT, U+0040 (@); HYPHEN-MINUS, U+002D (-); SOLIDUS, U+002F (/); and LOW LINE, U+005F (_). The mere inclusion of such a character in the protocol is not enough for it to be considered similar to another protocol using the same character; instead, handling of the character must be taken into consideration as well.
An important issue to tackle here is whether it is valuable to map to or from these special characters as part of the Stringprep replacement. In some locales, the analogue to FULL STOP, U+002E is some other character, and users may expect to be able to substitute their normal stop for FULL STOP, U+002E. At the same time, there are predictability arguments in favor of treating identifiers with FULL STOP, U+002E in them just the way they are treated under IDNA2008. Often, a string in a protocol is effectively a protocol element from another protocol. For instance, different systems might use the same credentials database for authentication.
Community Considerations
A Stringprep replacement that does anything more than just update Stringprep to the latest version of Unicode will probably entail some changes. It is important to identify the willingness of the protocol-using community to accept backwards-incompatible changes. By the same token, it is important to evaluate the desire of the community for features not available under Stringprep. Accordingly, as in IDNA2008, a Stringprep replacement that intends to be Unicode version agnostic will need to work out a mechanism to address cases where incompatible changes occur because of new Unicode versions.
Considerations for Stringprep Replacement
The above suggests the following guidance:
o A Stringprep replacement should be defined.
o The replacement should take an approach similar to IDNA2008 (e.g., by using properties of code points instead of whitelisting of code points), in that it enables better Unicode agility.
o Protocols share similar characteristics of strings. Therefore, defining internationalization preparation algorithms for the smallest set of string classes may be sufficient for most cases, providing coherence among a set of related protocols or protocols where identifiers are exchanged.
o The sets of string classes need to be evaluated according to the considerations that make up the headings in Section 5 o It is reasonable to limit scope to Unicode code points and rule the mapping of data from other character encodings outside the scope of this effort.
o The replacement ought to at least provide guidance to applications using the replacement on how to handle protocol incompatibilities resulting from changes to Unicode. In an ideal world, the Stringprep replacement would handle the changes automatically, but it appears that such automatic handling would require magic and cannot be expected. A number of the known cases of Stringprep use were evaluated during the preparation of this document. The known cases are here described in two ways. The types of identifiers the protocol uses is first called out in the ID type column (from Section 5.1.1) using the short forms "a" for Absolute, "d" for Definite, and "i" for Indefinite.
Next, there is a column that contains an "i" if the protocol string comes from user input, an "o" if the protocol string becomes userfacing output, "b" if both are true, and "n" if neither is true. Table 1 Appendix B
+------+--------+-------+ | RFC | IDtype | User? | +------+--------+-------
+ | 3722 | a | b | | 3748 | - | - | | 3920 | a,d | b | | 4505 | a | i | | 4314 | a,d | b | | 4954 | a,d | b | | 5034 | a,d | b | | 5804 | a,d | b | +------+--------+-------+
. Evaluation of Stringprep Profiles
This section is a summary of evaluation of Stringprep profiles that was done to get a good understanding of the usage of Stringprep. This summary is by no means normative nor the actual evaluations themselves. A template was used for reviewers to get a coherent view of all evaluations.
B.1. iSCSI Stringprep Profile: RFC 3720, RFC 3721, RFC 3722
Description: An iSCSI session consists of an initiator (i.e., host or server that uses storage) communicating with a target (i.e., a storage array or other system that provides storage). Both the iSCSI initiator and target are named by iSCSI names. The iSCSI Stringprep profile is used for iSCSI names.
How it is used: iSCSI initiators and targets (see above). They can also be used to identify SCSI ports (these are software entities in the iSCSI protocol, not hardware ports) and iSCSI logical units (storage volumes), although both are unusual in practice.
What entities create these identifiers? Generally, a human user (1) configures an automated system (2) that generates the names. Advance configuration of the system is required due to the embedded use of external unique identifier (from the DNS or IEEE).
How is the string input in the system? Keyboard and copy-paste are common. Copy-paste is common because iSCSI names are long enough to be problematic for humans to remember, causing use of email, sneaker-net, text files, etc., to avoid mistype mistakes.
Where do we place the dividing line between user interface and protocol? The iSCSI protocol requires that all internationalization string preparation occur in the user interface. The iSCSI protocol treats iSCSI names as opaque identifiers that are compared byte-by-byte for equality. iSCSI names are generally not checked for correct formatting by the protocol.
What entities enforce the rules? There are no iSCSI-specific enforcement entities, although the use of unique identifier information in the names relies on DNS registrars and the IEEE Registration Authority.
Comparison: Byte-by-byte.
Case Folding, Sensitivity, Preservation: Case folding is required for the code blocks specified in RFC 3454, Table B .2. The overall iSCSI naming system (UI + protocol) is case-insensitive.
What is the impact if the comparison results in a false positive?
Potential access to the wrong storage.
-If the initiator has no access to the wrong storage, an authentication failure is the probable result.
-If the initiator has access to the wrong storage, the resulting misidentification could result in use of the wrong data and possible corruption of stored data.
What is the impact if the comparison results in a false negative? Denial of authorized storage access.
What are the security impacts? iSCSI names may be used as the authentication identities for storage systems. Comparison problems could result in authentication problems, although note that authentication failure ameliorates some of the false positive cases.
Normalization: NFKC, as specified by RFC 3454.
Mapping: Yes, as specified by Table B .1 in RFC 3454.
Disallowed Characters: Only the following characters are allowed: -ASCII dash, dot, colon -ASCII lowercase letters and digits -Unicode lowercase characters as specified by RFC 3454. All other characters are disallowed.
Which other strings or identifiers are these most similar to? None --iSCSI names are unique to iSCSI.
Are these strings or identifiers sometimes the same as strings or identifiers from other protocols? No.
Does the identifier have internal structure that needs to be respected? Yes. ASCII dot, dash, and colon are used for internal name structure. These are not reserved characters, in that they can occur in the name in locations other than those used for structuring purposes (e.g., only the first occurrence of a colon character is structural, others are not).
How are users exposed to these strings? How are they published? iSCSI names appear in server and storage system configuration interfaces. They also appear in system logs.
Is the string / identifier used as input to other operations? Effectively, no. The rarely used port and logical unit names involve concatenation, which effectively extends a unique iSCSI name for a target to uniquely identify something within that target.
How much tolerance for change from existing Stringprep approach? Good tolerance; the community would prefer that internationalization experts solve internationalization problems.
How strong a desire for change (e.g., for Unicode agility)? Unicode agility is desired, in principle, as long as nothing significant breaks. Who Generates It: -Typically generated by email system administrators using some tools/conventions, sometimes from some backend database. -In some setups, human users can register their own usernames (e.g., webmail self-registration).
User Input Methods: -typing or selecting from a list -copy and paste -voice input -in configuration files or on the command line Enforcement: Rules enforced by server / add-on service (e.g., gateway service) on registration of account.
Comparison Method: "Type 1" (byte-for-byte) or "Type 2" (compare by a common algorithm that everyone agrees on (e.g., normalize and then compare the result byte-by-byte).
Case Folding, Sensitivity, Preservation: Most likely case-sensitive. Exact requirements on case-sensitivity/case-preservation depend on a specific implementation, e.g., an implementation might treat all user identifiers as case-insensitive (or case-insensitive for US-ASCII subset only). Operations: Sometimes concatenated with other data and then used as input to a cryptographic hash function.
How much tolerance for change from existing Stringprep approach? Not sure.
Background Information:
In RFC 5034, when describing the POP3 AUTH command:
The authorization identity generated by the SASL exchange is a simple username, and SHOULD use the SASLprep profile (see [RFC4013] ) of the StringPrep algorithm (see [RFC3454] ) to prepare these names for matching. If preparation of the authorization identity fails or results in an empty string (unless it was transmitted as the empty string), the server MUST fail the authentication.
In RFC 4954, when describing the SMTP AUTH command:
The authorization identity generated by this [SASL] exchange is a "simple username" (in the sense defined in [SASLprep]), and both client and server SHOULD (*) use the [SASLprep] profile of the [StringPrep] algorithm to prepare these names for transmission or comparison. If preparation of the authorization identity fails or results in an empty string (unless it was transmitted as the empty string), the server MUST fail the authentication.
(*) Note: Future revision of this specification may change this requirement to MUST. Currently, the SHOULD is used in order to avoid breaking the majority of existing implementations.
In RFC 5804, when describing the ManageSieve AUTHENTICATE command:
The authorization identity generated by this Who Generates It: -Typically generated by email system administrators using some tools/conventions, sometimes from some backend database. -In some setups, human users can register own usernames (e.g., webmail self-registration).
Case Folding, Sensitivity, Preservation: Most likely case-sensitive. Exact requirements on case-sensitivity/case-preservation depend on a specific implementation, e.g., an implementation might treat all user identifiers as case-insensitive (or case-insensitive for US-ASCII subset only). Who Generates It: Either generated by email system administrators using some tools/conventions, or specified by the human user.
User Input Methods: -typing or selecting from a list -copy and paste -voice input -in configuration files or on the command line Enforcement: Rules enforced by server / add-on service (e.g., gateway service or backend database) on registration of account.
Comparison Method: "Type 1" (byte-for-byte).
Case Folding, Sensitivity, Preservation: Most likely case-sensitive. String Classes: Currently defined as "simple username" (see Section 2 of RFC 4013 for details on restrictions); however, this is likely to be a different class from usernames. Note that some implementations allow spaces in these. Password in all email related protocols should be treated in the same way. Same passwords are frequently shared with web, IM, and etc. applications.
Internal Structure: None.
User Output: Text of email messages (e.g. in "you forgot your password" email messages), web page / directory, side of the bus / in ads --possible. Which other strings or identifiers are these most similar to? RFC 4505 says that the trace "should take one of two forms: an Internet email address, or an opaque string that does not contain the '@' (U+0040) character and that can be interpreted by the system administrator of the client's domain". In practice, this is a free-form text, so it belongs to a different class from "email address" or "username".
Are these strings or identifiers sometimes the same as strings or identifiers from other protocols (e.g., does an IM system sometimes use the same credentials database for authentication as an email system)? Yes: see above. However, there is no strong need to keep them consistent in the future.
How are users exposed to these strings, how are they published? No. However, the value can be seen in server logs.
Impacts of false positives and false negatives: False positive: a user can be confused with another user. False negative: two distinct users are treated as the same user. But note that the trace field is not authenticated, so it can be easily falsified.
Tolerance of changes in the community: The community would be flexible.
Delimiters: No internal structure, but see comments above about frequent use of email addresses.
Background Information: RFC 4505, Section 2 ("The Anonymous Mechanism"):
The mechanism consists of a single message from the client to the server. The client may include in this message trace information in the form of a string of [UTF-8]-encoded [Unicode] characters prepared in accordance with [StringPrep] and the "trace" stringprep profile defined in Section 3 of this document. The trace information, which has no semantical value, should take one of two forms: an Internet email address, or an opaque string that does not contain the '@' (U+0040) character and that can be interpreted by the system administrator of the client's domain. For privacy reasons, an Internet email address or other information identifying the user should only be used with permission from the user.
RFC 4505, Section 3 ('The "trace" Profile of "Stringprep"'): This section defines the "trace" profile of [StringPrep] . This profile is designed for use with the SASL ANONYMOUS Mechanism. Specifically, the client is to prepare the <message> production in accordance with this profile.
The character repertoire of this profile is Unicode 3.2 [Unicode].
No mapping is required by this profile.
No Unicode normalization is required by this profile.
The list of unassigned code points for this profile is that provided in Appendix A of [StringPrep] . Unassigned code points are not prohibited. -text of message (e.g., in a chatroom) -device names often not exposed to human users
